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Gerald David NAUGHTON and Yulia Pushkarevskaya NAUGHTON The Suffering Joker and the Cruel Joke: Nabokov's and Bellow's Dark Laughter
This article interrogates the interrelationship between cruelty, suffering, and laughter in novels by Saul Bellow and Vladim ir Nabokov, positing an affective reading of how bodies th at suffer com e to produce laughter as a confounding, unexpected, and at tim es inappropriate readerly affect. For the purpose of this com parative analysis, we have selected Nabokov's Laughter in the Dark and Bellow's Henderson the Rain King, both because of the intim ate connections between the writers and the significant overlaps in the texts themselves, in term s of how they posit suffering and laughter. Elsewhere we have spoken of the difficult and, in som e ways, intense relationship between the two writers : the "almost unbridgeable gap between them as writers and artists, as well as their rare, even for the literary world, burning hostility towards one another" (Pushkarevskaya Naughton and Naughton 121) . Nabokov once com plained that "Saul Bellow, a m iserable m ediocrity, should never have appeared on the jacket of a book about m e" and asks his editor if it is "too late to elim inate that exhaust puff" from the cover of his book (Vladimir 434). Bellow once wrote in a letter that Nabokov "rubbed [him ] the wrong way" and that Nabokov, "at his gruesome worst ... pins fem inine roses to sim ian bosoms" (Saul Bellow: Selected Letters), suggesting perhaps that Nabokov is a writer who is inordinately fond of the grotesque.
Despite these tensions, the two writers' novels frequently exhibit startling, precise m irror reflections of each other. Bellow and Nabokov, indeed, weave com plex m atrices of sim ilarity, divergence, and antipathy. They frequently occupy sim ilar fictive terrain, leaving a sense that, despite their proclaimed ill feeling, com parative readings of Bellow and Nabokov can help illum inate our understanding of the two writers, and unpick the m atrices that such comparisons create. Key to this com parative enterprise is an analysis of Bellow's and Nabokov's divergent understanding of suffering. Laughter in the Dark and Henderson the Rain King both explore suffering as a form of excessive som atic cruelty inflicted on protagonists who, in experiencing such punishment, engender a strange, troubling, and potentially transform ative form of laughter.
Suffering in Saul Bellow has typically been conceived of either in its connection to hum anism, English rom anticism, or-m ore typically-as part of a tradition of Jewish literature that expresses despair out of a frustrated idealism (Chavkin 161) . According to John J. Clayton, Bellow's frequent writing on suffering expresses sim ply "Jewish despair, Jewish guilt and self-hatred, Jewish m asochism" (53) . Many critics also point to the fact that in Bellow, suffering ne ed not to be seen futile, as "it leads to self-knowledge and also to knowledge of the other" (Flath 84) . Much of Bellow's work, however, cautions against placing value on suffering, which he sees as a ubiquitous and unrom antic fact. In this regard, we m ay recall Moses Herzog's depiction of the effects of suffering, which m ost commonly " breaks people, crushes them , and is sim ply unillum inating" (317) . Yet, in the very sam e paragraph, Herzog also writes the following:
Why not say rather that people of powerful imagination, given to dreaming deeply and to raising up marvelous and self-sufficient fictions, turn to suffering sometimes to cut into their bliss, as people pinch themselves to feel awake. I know that my suffering, if I may speak of it, has often been like that, a more extended form of life, a striving for true wakefulness and an antidote to illusion, and therefore I can take no moral credit for it. I am willing without further exercise in pain to open my heart. And this needs no doctrine or theology of suffering. (317) Here, we arrive at a com plicated fram ing of what suffering m eans, or potentially can m ean to Bellow's suffering jokers. While refusing the unnecessary and "unillum inating" doctrines of suffering that m ay fashionably be offered as validation or transform ation of human pain, he equally values the potential to "extend" reality at the core of the experience of suffering.
Nabokov is sim ilarly preoccupied with the transform ation of suffering into laughter. Suffering in Nabokov is generally startling because he typically eschews suffering. In his lectures on Russian literature, Nabokov fam ously described "Dostoyevsky's lack of taste" in depicting the excessive suffering of his characters" who agonize and "sin their way to Jesus" (Lectures 104). Although Bellow was influenced by depictions of spiritual suffering in Dostoyevsky, the focus in his own novels, like in Nabokov's novels, is on physical suffering. Cruelty in both Nabokov and Bellow is endured and articulated by the suffering body. The critical questions here are: to what extent is it possible to laugh at a suffering body, how can the suffering body, subjected to cruelty or punishm ent, produce laughter, and what reconceptualizations of suffering ensue? In order to bring together a discussion of the body, suffering, cruelty, and laughter in Nabokov and Bellow, we use Henri Bergson's idea of the "elasticity" of laughter Joker and the Cruel Joke: Nabokov's and Bellow 's Dark Laughter" CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 21.5 (2019): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol 21/iss5/14> Special Issue Suffering, Endurance, Understanding. Ed. Simon Estok, Douglas Berman, and Frank Stevenson in connection to cruelty and suffering, and various 'affective' form ulations of the body. In both writers, such Bergsonian elasticity of laughter is what allows for laughing at suffering, but there are crucial differences in their depictions of somatic suffering, particularly the responses they elicit from the reader.
Theory's m uch discussed "affective turn" --or perhaps m ore accurately "sensory turn"-prim arily focuses on the non-discursive construction of individual and social experience. Much of this work, of course, stems from biological and neuroscientific m odels which configure the body and the m ind as inextricable systems. In the words of Nicholas Daly, such theories posit "that feeling and thinking are not discrete activities; that cognitive decision-making is shaped by em otion; and that em otions m ight be considered as a form of em bodied cognition" (226). To give one exam ple, neuroscientist Antonio Dam asio has fam ously suggested that "em otions and feelings m ay not be intruders in the bastion of reason at all: they m ay be enm eshed in its networks for worse and for better" (xii). Key to this "enm eshed" image of thought and em otion is an altered understanding of the sensory body's own prim acy in hum an experience and subjectivity.
Claire Hem m ings, for instance, argues that the work of affect theory is to construe "states of being," rather than socially determ ined perspectives on the subject. "All of our affective experiences to date that are rem embered", she claim s, constitute us in "the m oment of responding to a new situation" (552). In other words, according to this view, the body "registers" experiences and stim uli which cre ate individual subjectivity as we understand it. Thus, the body operates outside of social or hum anistic explanation. The sensory body carries a prim acy that questions and com plicates notions of an autonomous self beyond processes of em bodiment. Or, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty fam ously put it in his final lecture, it is the body itself, le corps propre, that m akes consciousness corporeal. He wrote: "Insofar as I have hands, feet, a body, I sustain around m e intentions which are not dependent on my decisions and which affect m y surroundings in a way that I do not choose" (511).
What of the suffering body? Suffering has often been spoken about by affect theorists, though usually in its m ore dark and som ber forms. Sara Ahm ed, for exam ple, has done much to highlig ht the affective dim ensions and political economies of of pain, suffering, and victim hood: "It is significant that the word 'passion' and the word 'passive' share the sam e root in the Latin word for 'suffering' (passio). To be passive is to be enacted upon, as a negation that is already felt as suffering. The fear of passivity is tied to the fear of em otionality, in which weakness is defined in terms of a tendency to be shaped by others. Softness is narrated as a proneness to injury" (3).
In assessing cruel laughter and suffering jokers, it is clear that this m odel of passivity does not always hold. Bellow's Eugene Henderson, for exam ple, vigorously perform s and displays his suffering body, rendering his torm ent and distress as active and dynam ic . He also m akes his suffering body a subject of joking and an object of laughter. Nabokov's Albert Albinus, on the other hand, though a victim of som atic cruelty and suffering, also inflicts suffering on others, which enables the narrative's ironic tone and the reader's laughter.
Henri Bergson discusses suffering and cruelty in connection to what he calls the "elasticity" of laughter, that is to say the tem porary but profound change of the self through laughter. According to the critic John Bruns, laughter should be understood as a particular affect that foregrounds the unexpected, and by confounding our expectations, unsettles us into becoming someone other than who we are Hem m ings 549) . "What is so comical," asks Bruns, "about cruelty?" Bergson's essay on "Laughter" would answer this question with a single word: "elasticity." Bergson configures laughter as a m ovement, rather than a state or condition. It contains no "epistemological essence," and does not correspond to the subjectivity of the person who laughs. In order for us to laugh at cruelty and suffering, we ourselves do not need to change, because laughter itself is the very elem ent of change (66).
Laughter, for Bergson, is indeed a troubling agent for change. He argues that the cost of this transform ation is to silence and suffocate em otion. There is, he posits, "an absence of feeling which usually accompanies laughter" (130):
It seems as though the comic would not produce its disturbing effect unless it fell, so to say, on the surface of a soul that is thoroughly calm and unruffled. Indifference is its natural environment, for laughter has no greater foe than emotion. I do not mean that we could not laugh at a person who inspires us with pity, for instance, or even with affection, but in such a case we must, for the moment, put our affection out of court and impose silence upon our pity. (63) This is particularly true of the depiction of suffering in Nabokov's cruel com edies, where it is the very absoluteness of the protagonist's affliction that engenders our m irth. The disproportionate, comedic proportions of Albinus's suffering actually precludes or "silences" other, m ore appropriately "emotional" responses. Such is the "disturbing effect" of laughter's "elasticity." Joker and the Cruel Joke: Nabokov's and Bellow's Dark Laughter" CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 21.5 (2019): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol 21/iss5/14> Special Issue Suffering, Endurance, Understanding. Ed. Simon Estok, Douglas Berman, and Frank Stevenson Moreover, in the previously cited quotation from Herzog, we noted Bellow's depiction of suffering as a transform ative state, m oving us from "dream" to "true wakefulness" (317), from "imagination" to fact (317). Here we can see parallels with Bergson's depictions of hum or as a property of change. In Henderson the Rain King, the protagonist clearly follows Herzog's type, as the "person of powerful im agination, given to dream ing deeply and to raising up m arvelous and self-sufficient fictions" (317), where the power of that im agination is perpetually undercut by harsh physical reality-the "cut" into the "bliss," the pinch to feel awake. This is where hum or is derived from in m uch of Bellow's fiction: that sim ple m ovement from the m etaphysical to the physical, or from bliss to pain. Suffering, in other words, becomes Bergsonian laughter in his novels.
As will be argued below, the transformation affected by cruel laughter takes m any forms. Though in both Laughter in the Dark and Henderson the Rain King, hum or is written through the excessive suffering of the two protagonists, the effects of such laughter are divergent. There is an unavoidable difference between Bellow's and Nabokov's cruel com edies. Allen Guttm ann has discussed Henderson the Rain King as one of Bellow's novels of "unsurpassed comedies" which derive from the "gusty eloquence" of their first-person narrators. Forced to choose between complaint and comedy, Guttmann argues, these protagonists choose comedy. In Nabokov, this elem ent of choice is abs ent. While in Bellow, the characters are joking about their own suffering and invite the readers to laugh along, in Nabokov, it is the narrator and the reader who are com plicit in "laughter in the dark." Thus, though in both writers suffering has the capacity to be transformed into Bergsonian laughter, the effect is m ore "disturbing" in Nabokov, to continue the trail of Bergson's thought, because the im pulse to laugh com es not from the "suffering body" itself, but from the observer (the narrator and the re ader). The "suffering joker" is an often-cited, though somewhat ill-defined, concept in Bellow's fiction. The phrase, of course, was initially used by Bellow in Herzog (1963) , in a curious scene in which Moses Herzog, the brilliant academ ic, whose intellec tual constructs prove to be com ically outsized and inapplicable when compared to the everyday, "human" crises that engulf him -the end of his m arriage to Madeleine, her adultery with a fam ily friend. The novel represents Herzog's hopelessly comic attempts to intellectualize the unravelling of this m arriage. As he recalls the m oment his wife informed him of her decision to leave, he is plunged into a purely physical reality. The conversation had taken place at their hom e in the Berkshires, where Moses had bee n working in its wild, overgrown garden. Recalling the scene, he finds his sense of an autonom ous self dissolving. He watches him self: "In his posture of collapse on the sofa, arm s abandoned over his head and legs stretched away, lying with no m ore style than a chim panzee, his eyes with greater than norm al radiance watched his own work in the garden with detachment, as if he were looking through the front end of a telescope at a tiny clear im age. That suffering joker" (14). Bellow's construct here is full of affect; while the thinking subject suffers "abandonment" and "detachment," the physical detail evokes "clarity" and "radiance ." The im age is anim ate-sensual, physical, "anim al" --and the self is given over to the production of this sensual incarnation.
The figure of the suffering joker, however, certainly preceded Herzog. Defined sim ply by Sanford Pinsker as "eggheads with lives 'in great disorder'" (223), Bellow's suffering jokers appear as protagonists in m ost of his great novels: Moses Herzog, Eugene Henderson, and Charlie Citrine in Humbolt's Gift, am ong others, have all been delineated through this comedy of cruelty. It is a mode described by Malcolm Bradbury as a delicate balance between "seriousness" and "absurdity":
The resulting perception is indeed comedy in its seriousness: which is an observation of disparity, an awareness that we are, indeed, 'suffering jokers', vital but absurd, and of a secret freedom, lying in our gift to know. History, environment, concept and the reality -instructors tell us much, and much of it makes us despair; but against that there is a self-presence, vivid and curious, and of it Bellow is surely one of the great modern metaphysical comedians. (104) This notion of "m etaphysical" com edy has become relatively pervasive in criticism on Bellow. The physical in Bellow is always entwined with personal identity, thought, and m eaning. Jam es Wood describes Bellow's suffering joker figures as com ic strivers, "em bodied souls": "Their bodies are their confessions, their m oral cam ouflage faulty and peeling: they have the bodies they deserve" (194) . Everything in Bellow's fictive universe is, to a pro found degree, em bodied.
Here, we should pause to acknowledge that reading Bellow affectively, of course, m ay seem to be counterintuitive. Frequently cited as a writer of hum anistic, even m oralistic, thought, Bellow has been read as distinctively out of ste p with any "affective turn" in literary theory. Paul Giles has pointed to Bellow's reduced prestige in a posthumanist age, dism issing him as a writer of "curm udgeonly liberal hum anism" (qtd. in Pushkarevskaya Naughton and Naughton 122). His art is frequent ly seen as prim arily Joker and the Cruel Joke: Nabokov's and Bellow's Dark Laughter" CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 21.5 (2019): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol 21/iss5/14> Special Issue Suffering, Endurance, Understanding. Ed. Simon Estok, Douglas Berman, and Frank Stevenson exam ining the psychological suffering of individuals within an oppressive socio -historical setting (Pushkarevskaya Naughton and Naughton 122). Such struggles, so it would seem, reinforce our hum anistic ideas of self and individuality, agency and choice. What we propose to do in this article, however, is to draw focus away from self-contained and enclosed selves, instead focusing m ore on Bellow's representations of the body and its affects. Eugene Henderson's very form is m onstrous, considering his ill-health, bodily scars, and the dam age that life has done to him . It is also a powerful em blem of his capacity for further suffering-a giant m ound of flesh awaiting further punishment.
In In order to be able to join in such "poisonous laughter, Bellow's and Nabokov's readers need a screen from cruelty. In Bellow, the characters themselves render their suffering funny, which helps us to see it as funny, too. In Nabokov, it is the am biguous, ironic narrator who, in part, shields us from cruelty. In Laughter in the Dark, Albinus suffers greatly when he is blinded, but he is not aware of the cruelty inflicted upon him . Because he is blind, he do es not see Rex, Margot's rogue lover, boldly installed in the sam e house as he, though he does suspect that there m ay be som eone else living in the house. When Margot pretends to pity Albinus, she m akes faces and m im ics him to am use Rex. Eventually, Paul, Albinus's brother-in-law, com es to rescue Albinus after his ex-wife, Elizabeth, discovers that his cheques are forged. The utter cruelty of the scene witnessed by Paul upon arrival to the little chalet in Switzerland is striking: "stark naked" Rex slapping Albinus's knees and tickling his face with a grass stem (186), m aking his victim produce "helpless m ovement" here and there (187). "This was good fun indeed ," the narrator comments ironically (187). Although the reader does find Rex, by all accounts, repu gnant, the cruelty with which he treats Albinus in the final section of the novel is part of the narrative's dark humor. It is as if the "disturbing" laughter, described by Bergson, suspends our capacity to feel for Nabokov's long-suffering protagonist. This is facilitated, to som e extent, by Albinus's own lack of com passion (for his wife and daughter, whom he deserted abruptly earlier in the novel), by his incapacity to grieve the death of his child, and his com plete -somewhat comical and som ewhat unsettling-surrender to the eroticism of his relationship with Margot. Did Nabokov intend to m ake a m oral point out of Albinus's m idlife crisis and its ensuing suffering, or does the cruelty of his narrative only serve to make us laugh?
Nabokov fam ously began Laughter in the Dark with a synopsis: "Once upon a tim e there lived in Berlin, Germ any, a m an called Albinus. He was rich, respectable, happy; one day he abandoned his wife for the sake of a youthful m istress; he loved; was not loved; and his life ended in disaster" (1). The narrator continues by questioning the value of telling the story, but states that there is "profit and pleasure in the telling" and that "detail is always welcome" (1). Considering the extent of his character's suffering in the novel and the gusto with which his suffering is described, there is certainly an element of pleasure in the way Nabokov writes such cruelty. The resulting narrative is funny in a dark, m ischievous, and grotesque kind of way.
Several critics and writers have pointed out Nabokov's propensity towards cruelty. Leland de la Durantaye, in particular, argues that there is a "pattern of cruelty" in Nabokov's fiction. He cites, among others, Richard Rorty, who in his essay on Nabokov, contends that the "central topic" of Nabokov's books is "cruelty," Martin Am is, who described 'Nabokov as the "laureate of cruelty," and Italo Calvino, who while crediting Nabokov "with having, 'invented an English of extraordinary richness'" also claimed that as a writer Nabokov "possessed 'an extraordinary cynicism and a form idable cruelty'" (qtd. in De la Durantaye 301-302). De la Durantaye argues that not only "Nabokov's characters are cruel to other characters" but "Nabokov is also cruel to them," in his excessive control over the characters and in the way "the unjust" are not "punished" in his novels (303). It is som ewhat perplexing that a writer as com plex and ironic as Nabokov would be expected to operate in a Manichean fictional universe, where 'good' characters are rewarded and 'evil' characters are punished. Rather than exploring "patterns of cruelty," Nabokov frequently presents us with patterns of m utual exploitation and explores suffering as an inevitable affect. He does this with the level of ironic detachment that is cons istent with all of his work-if Beckett once claim ed that "nothing is as funny as unhappiness," then Nabokov m ay have sim ilarly claim ed that suffering is actually funny-but the ultim ate choice of how to handle cruelty lies with the reader. Julian Connolly provides an unequivocal appraisal of Nabokov's intentions in Laughter in the Dark: "The portrait of Axel Rex painted by Nabokov in Laughter in the Dark is pretty clear: Joker and the Cruel Joke: Nabokov's and Bellow's Dark Laughter" CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 21.5 (2019): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol 21/iss5/14> Special Issue Suffering, Endurance, Understanding. Ed. Simon Estok, Douglas Berman, and Frank Stevenson Nabokov's readers are m eant to evaluate him negatively, and not to find his tricks hilarious, especially the ones he directs at Albinus after the m an has lost his sight" (3). It seems that the relationship between the author, narrator, and reader is far m o re complex. Otherwise, why would Nabokov include such a level of detail in describing suffering and cruelty? Rex finds torturing Albinus am using, and his am usement is connected to his art. Rex is a caricaturist and caricatures are produced specifically to evoke laughter. Nabokov has Rex m use about this in the novel:
A great painter one day, high up on the scaffold, began moving backward to view better his finished fresco. The next receding step would have taken him over, and, as a warning cry might be fa tal, his apprentice had the presence of mind to sling the contents of a pail at the masterpiece. Very funny! But how much funnier still, had the rapt master been left to walk back into nothing-with, incidentally, the spectators expecting the pail. The art of caricature, as Rex understood it, was thus based (apart from its synthetic, fooled -again nature) on the contrast between cruelty on one side and credulity on the other. And if, in real life, Rex looked on without stirring a finger while a blind beggar, his stick tapping happily, was about to sit down on a freshly painted bench, he was only deriving inspiration for his next little picture. (92) If it is possible for people to laugh at suffering as depicted in caricatures, m ight it also be possible to laugh at suffering inflicted by a caricaturist or, indeed, to laugh at the helplessness of suffering?
Perhaps the response elicited by the narrative is one of suppressed laughter. Laughter is an affect com ing from the reader, just as irony lies with the narrator. If our first im pulse, or affect, is to laugh, the second reaction is to evaluate our own capacity to laugh at hum an suffering, An influential study by Ellen Pifer, Nabokov and the Novel (1980), explored the ability of Nabokov's fiction to m ake the reader decide "how far we go about the act of reading, often centred on the issue of our resistance to his variously seductive, brilliant and cruel narrators" (Norman and White 9). "Beyond this ," Norman and White note, the "debate over the intersection of Nabokov's ethics and aesthetics has been far from settled, and seems unlikely to become so" (9). Although it is undeniable that "Nabokov's fiction is inextricably concerned with questions of cruelty, responsibility, tyranny, freedom and, above all, suffering" (9), these issues are in m any ways affects produced by the reader. Like Bellow's characters, Nabokov's readers learn to be affected and explore the lim its of their affects. Thus, if Nabokov's novel is darkly funny, to what extent is it appropriate to laugh at cruelty and suffering in Laughter in the Dark?
Nabokov's narrative does not, of course, give the answer to this question, or any other question, and retreats into aestheticism (hence the final fram ing of dying Albinus as a film shot). The ethics o f watching cruelty and suffering resides with the reader, as does laughter. Connolly sum marizes the effects of narrative cruelty in Nabokov:
Ultim ately, I think that there is a clear ethical dim ension to Nabokov's use of hum or in these novels. When one reads (and laughs at) the words of Nabokov's two narrators, one realizes that one needs to consider those narrators' agendas and attitudes toward the figures and situations they describe. One is not an ethically "bad" reader if one finds hum or in Hum bert's or Pnin's narrator's jokes, but one m ight be and ethically and aesthetically bad reader if one does not recognize the poison in the pen. "Go ahead and laugh," Nabokov seem s to be saying, "but think about what you are laughing at, and why you are laughing." (10)
In other words, laughing at suffering and cruelty ethically dem ands a certain level of self-awareness and self-reflection, but is not unethical per se.
The ethics of suffering and cruelty in Nabokov's little novel is generally quite m uddled. Margot, Albinus's m istress, and her illicit lover, Rex, are cruel towards Albinus, but Albinus is also cruel towards his wife and even his seven-year-old daughter. Indeed, by the tim e Albinus begins to suffer in the novel, which is the point at which he be comes blind, we expect him to suffer, both because of his blindness to the suffering of others and because of his blindness to the foolishness of his situation (a m iddle -aged m an stereotypically exploited by a young, vulgar m istress). As the novella spins its dark tale, Albinus him self also exhibits a particular type of cruelty towards him self-what Lauren Berlant term s "cruel optim ism" -whereby his relationship with his m istress, Margot, becomes an unhealthy and destructive obsession. "Death often is the point of life's joke" (117), says Rex in Laughter in the Dark. Death for his victim Albinus, who ends up cuckolded, blinded and abused by his m istress and her lover, is also relief. The cruelty of the narrative in this case is also, in som e ways, the cruelty of the reader, who anticipates Albinus's death.
The reader, of course, knows that Albinus is going to die, because the narrator says so in the very first sentence of the novel. But there is som ething else, in the way we feel about Albinus, and this is Joker and the Cruel Joke: Nabokov's and Bellow's Dark Laughter" CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 21.5 (2019): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol 21/iss5/14> Special Issue Suffering, Endurance, Understanding. Ed. Simon Estok, Douglas Berman, and Frank Stevenson where Bellow's and Nabokov's visions of suffering and laughter begin to become enm eshed. There is som ething lacking in Nabokov's protagonist-indeed, there is som ething m onstrous about the way in which he handles his grief over the death of his daughter, Irm a, and returns back to his young m istress, Margot. His grief is obscured by the eroticism of his relationship with Margot, so that as he returns to Irm a's nursery: "instead of thinking of his child he saw another figure, a graceful, lively, wanton girl" (118). He seems to lack the capacity to suffer deeply on behalf of others. Indeed, it m ay well be apt here to recall Bellow's description in Herzog of "people of powerful im agination, given to dreaming deeply and to raising up m arvelous and self-sufficient fictions" who, in som e sense, need to suffer in order to experience reality (317). If pain, in Bellow's fictive universe can represent "true wakefulness and an antidote to illusion" (Herzog 317), we m ay be tem pted to say that Laughter in the Dark is suggestive of sim ilar illum inations. Having elided suffering at his daughter's death, Albinus is initiated into reality through his own pain. Thus, it is only later, when Albinus is blinded in a car crash that we witness his suffering: "those paroxysms of deadly horror, when he had howled, flung him self about ... with the panic of one who wakes to find him self in the grave" (165). Stripped of his ability to see, Albinus is cruelly deceived and tortured by Margot and her lover Rex. What com es after, when Albinus t ries to kill Margot in revenge but dies him self, is a strange relief, even "bliss": "So that's all," he thought quite softly, as if he were lying in bed. "I m ust keep quiet for a little space and then walk very slowly along that bright sand of pain, toward that blue, blue wave. What bliss there is in blueness. I never knew how blue blueness could be. What a m ess life has been. Now I know everything. Coming, coming, coming to drown m e. There it is. How it hurts. I can't breathe …" (197). Albinus's "Now I know everything" reads as ironic. The transform ations that such suffering can potentially enact in a writer like Bellow seem to fall flat. Suffering returns Albinus to somatic reality, but the profundity of his knowledge goes no further than "how it hurts." At this final point of the narrative, the reader is also strangely relieved at Albinus's death (for living blind was undoubtedly torture to him ) and strangely am used to see the end of the narrative fram ed in cinematic terms, like the "last silent scene," with "stage directions" provided (196). Albinus's suffering at the end of the novel thus is aestheticized and performed. The reader feels little of Albinus's som atic pain, and, arguably, little em otion other than "laughter in the dark."
Contrasting with Nabokov's retreat from physical pain to som ething abstract or aesthetic, the eponymous hero of Henderson the Rain King suffers as an initiation into a som atic, visceral, even m edical reality. Indeed, m uch of the novel is taken up with the m edical com plaints of Bellow's suffering protagonist. Bad teeth, war injuries, and other ailm ents plague Eugene Henderson's body to a com ical degree. At the beginning of the novel, he provides a description of his physical state which serves as a sort of affective biography: "When I think of m y condition at the age of fifty-five when I bought the ticket, all is grief. The facts begin to crowd m e and soon I get a pressure in the chest. A disorderly rush begins --m y parents, m y wives, m y girls, m y children, m y farm , m y anim als, m y habits, m y m oney, m y m usic lessons, m y drunkenness, m y prejudices, m y brutality, m y teeth, m y face, m y soul! " (1). Henderson aspires to become a doctor him self, and alludes to m uch reading of m edical literature, yet m any of his com plaints appear to be beyond his understanding. "What I have defies classification" he tells the African king, Dahfu, him self also a trained m edical doctor as well as being a kind of spiritual m entor to Henderson. To Dahfu, Henderson's suffering (and the toll that this suffering has taken on his body) "illustrates volum es" (209). "To m e you are a treasure of illustrations ," he tells Henderson. "I do not condemn your looks. Only I see the world in your constitution" (210). What we find here is a uniquely Bellovian fram ing of a physical reality that is deeply "illustrative." Later in the text, Henderson learns, through Dahfu, of a condition called "Obersteiner's allochiria," a rare syndrome in which the brain transposes sensations from the left and right sides of the body to the opp osite sides (237). It is a phenomenon that fascinates Dahfu, because of the way it questions our understanding of the interaction between m ind and body. Writing in The New York Review of Books, Adam Kirsch has pointed to the prom inence of this obscure m edical detail at the heart of Bellow's text:
As good scientific rationalists, we have learned that the m ind is the product of the body; where earlier generations spoke of the soul or spirit, we speak only of epiphenomena of the brain. In allochiria, however, we can glim pse for a m oment the com plementary truth that the body-the way we perceive and live in the body-is also a product of the m ind. And if the m ind is powerful enough to turn left to right and right to left, could it also be able to shape the body's growth and form ?
Dahfu lectures Henderson on this idea obsessively: "The spirit of the person in a sense is the author of his body," he tells him (229). In other words, the body itself is an epiphenomenon, and in reading the Joker and the Cruel Joke: Nabokov's and Bellow's Dark Laughter" CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 21.5 (2019): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol 21/iss5/14> Special Issue Suffering, Endurance, Understanding. Ed. Simon Estok, Douglas Berman, and Frank Stevenson body, we are forced to consider its affective dim ensions. Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth indicate, by way of Bruno Latour, how "the body becomes less about its nature as bounded substance or eternal essence than the body 'as an interface that becomes m ore and m ore describable when it learns to be affected by m any m ore elements'" (11) . "Learning to be affected," in the case of Henderson, and many other Bellovian protagonists indicates exposure to intensities-to extrem e em otions and crises, to excesses of physical, em otional, and spiritual suffering. In Bellow, bodies thems elves are affectsform ed and twisted into shapes by m edical or physical processes that are in turn the very stuff of what m akes us hum an.
Eugene Henderson, the exaggerated sufferer, is him self Bellow's best illustration of this concept. Learning that his physical appearance is perhaps all there is to him , he is disconsolate. "Why, King. . . that's the worst news I ever heard," he responds (229). Throughout the novel, his own physical grotesqueness has been at the heart of Henderson's m ost intensely hum orous descriptions. Affliction for him is described as "an occupation" (23). "Am erica is so big, he reflects, and everybody is working, m aking, digging, bulldozing, trucking, loading, and so on, and I guess the sufferers suffer at the same rate" (23). His appearance is resultantly bizarre, com bining "strength and size with grotesque ferocity" (Kirsch): "I was huge but helpless, form idable in looks, but of one piece like a totem pole, or a kind of Galapagos turtle" (61).
Critics have attem pted to position the process described by Dahfu as som ething like Em ersonian transcendentalism , but what should be noted in Bellow's vision is not, as is often supposed, how physical detail can reflect a m ore profound, deeper, "spiritual" truth (see, for exam ple, Wood 137), but rather how physical and psychic realities are both, at various tim es, processes of affect --processes that are beyond the control of any organizing hum an consciousness, or of any human capacity for choice. Man "him self is his principal work of art," Dahfu tells Henderson in one of his m any lectures on the subject (228). It is the kind of statem ent that would appear to privilege "m ind" over "body." But as he continues, we realize that what he is describing is an affective non-sequential chain in which body and m ind commingle chaotically. It is, according to him , "the flesh influencing the mind, the m ind influencing the flesh, back again to the m ind, back once m ore to the flesh" (227). Thus, a reciprocal relationship is outlined, in which the body indexes a "state of being," and processes of em bodiment are inextricable from subjectivity.
This creates a natural dispute with Cartesian divisions of body and m ind. Saul Bellow was, of course, aware of the hum an tendency to experience thought as disem bodied. Eugene Henderson, indeed, continuously perceives a gap between idea and action: "I often want to say things and they stay in my m ind. Therefore they don't actually exist; you can't take credit for them if they never emerge" (168). If anything, Bellow's protagonist feels some sort of antagonism between body and m ind: "That's how it is with m y ideas. . . They seem to get strong while I weaken" (90). Dahfu, however, instructs him against such Cartesian divides. Ellen Pifer (1991), am ong others, has noted this aspect of the novel. Dahfu teaches his friend on the "connection between insides and outsides, especially as applied to human beings" (Bellow, Henderson 227). "[S]peaking som atically" (209), Dahfu illustrates the "utterly dynam ic" (227) non-Cartesian union of body and m ind-"the body, working in the flesh. What m iracle! What trium ph! Also, what a disaster! What tears are to be shed!" (228).
Though Henderson resists, he is ultim ately forced to com e face-to-face with his own em bodiment, through his encounter with the lion Atti, which represents to him a fundam ental and "unavoidable" (251) totem of em bodied reality. Dahfu com pels his friend to confront death "som atically" rather than abstractly, and this, gradually creates a sense of the body's inextricable prim acy. He is encouraged to physically im itate and em ulate the anim al, finally abandoning himself to wild roaring. "And so I was the beast," he declares. "I gave m yself to it, and all m y sorrow cam e out in the roaring (258). Thus, the novel ultim ately elides any distinctions between m ind and body, soul and body, or hum an and anim al, and it is through Henderson's acute suffering that we become aware of a com plex process of the interactions between the self and the world in relation to its surroundings. This is the transform ation of perception that Deleuze and Guattari theorize in term s of jum ping from the "plane of organization" to one of im m anence, and it m ight equally happen through attending to rather than evacuating the body as affect, as "the variation that occurs when bodies collide or com e into contact" (Colm an 11). The bodies contain their fate as "im m anence," and the relationships between the bodies 'colliding or coming into contact' are also 'im m anent'. Like in Bellow's Henderson, characters in Nabokov's Laughter in the Dark are defined through their bodies, and the physical detail encapsulates the fate of the unfortunate trio. Albinus, for exam ple, is described as "good-looking, in a quiet well-bred way," with a "pleasant sm ile" and "mild blue eyes which bulged a little when he was thinking hard"; he also has a "slight hesitation in his speech, the best part of a stam m er" (6). He is torm ented by his Joker and the Cruel Joke: Nabokov's and Bellow's Dark Laughter" CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 21.5 (2019): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol 21/iss5/14> Special Issue Suffering, Endurance, Understanding. Ed. Simon Estok, Douglas Berman, and Frank Stevenson unfulfilled erotic desire and a longing for beauty. Margot is described as having a "slight figure ," with a "swiftness of ...dispassionate m ovements ," "limpid" eyes, and a "pale, sulky, painfully beautiful face" (10). It physically hurts Albinus to look at her and so he is forced to turn away from her when he first m eets her (10). Rex is "tall", "slim ", with "square shoulders" m oving "splendidly" as he walks -his virile m asculinity is in direct opposition to Albinus's "mildness." Rex's "full red lips" (186), bountiful body hair, such as the "black hair in the shape of a spread eagle" on his chest (20), and his tanned skin are referenced frequently, giving the reader a sense of not only the physicality of his presence, but also a sense of m enace emanating from him .
All of the action and dram a in the novel is produced by these three bodies "colliding and coming into contact," as Deleuze and Guattari would have it: Margot is predictably sm itten and enslaved by Rex, Albinus is im prisoned in his longing for Margot, Rex controls and exploits both -"Rex," a "dom inant gene," as his nam e suggests, winning over "Albinus''s recessive gene." The nature of human relationships in Laughter in the Dark is thus presented to us in stark bodily and biological term s. Like Bellow, Nabokov also points to the connections between the inside and outside, the body and the mind, biological destiny and m etaphysical fate. When Bellow once complained that Nabokov spent m uch of his tim e "pinning roses to sim ian bosoms" (2010), pointing out, perhaps justifiably, the distinctly anim alistic nature of the lover figure in Nabokov, he also involuntarily acknowledged the intim ate connections between Nabokov's fictional world and his own-processes of em bodiment, of bodies com ing into contact, and som atically driven plots. The defining qualitie s of the body are signaled early: Albinus's bulging eyes, for exam ple, signal his weakness as a thinking being in the face of the purely physical (though also thinking, in a predatory kind of way) bodies of Margot and Rex. References to blindness, in the m etaphorical sense, abound in the novel and serve as a prem onition of Albinus's physical deterioration: there are over thirty references to blindness, in one form or another, in this short novel. The postman concludes "thoughtfully" that "love is blind" in his gossipy chat with the hall-porter about Albinus and Margot (122). Albinus describes himself as "blind" upon confronting Margot about her affair with Rex (152). His physical blindness is self-inflicted, as if the body fulfills the prophecy of the m ind: he speeds down a sharp bend in a car, becoming physically blind in the ensuing accident. Entrapped in his blind body, given to the com plete control of the predatory Margot and Rex, he is doom ed to suffer and to die cruelly. Nabokov uses blindness, perhaps the m ost severe lim itation of the body, as a way of showing his character's entrapment in his body, which enables the novel's focus on som atic suffering. It is this inevitability, as well as Albinus's previous indifference to the others' suffering, which makes the rest of the story possible to laugh at. The cruelty of the reader who laughs at his suffering and even death is akin to the com plicity of spectators watching pain on the screen, ultim ately revealing that laughter is integral to how hum ans deal with suffering. Nabokov's tale is thus an appeal to the very perversity of hum an nature, where serious, rational thought, which would prohibit laughing at suffering, can be suspended in order to laugh at suffering.
Both Nabokov and Bellow explore suffering through som atic cruelty and the ensuing unsettling laughter, with a crucial difference. In Bellow's Henderson the Rain King, it is the protagonist himself who jokes about his suffering body. In Nabokov's Laughter in the Dark, it is the ironic narrator who sim ultaneously invites the reader to "laugh in the dark" and to check such laughter. What em erges in both novels is an illustration of what Henri Bergson term s the "plasticity of laughter" and the em ergence of laughter as an unsettling readerly affect. Laughing about suffering thus m ay well become suffering after laughing, as the reader is forced to explore the em otional and ethical im plications of such cruel laughter.
